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Abstract
This paper argues that analyses of the ways in which Big Data has been enacted in other academic disciplines can provide
us with concepts that will help understand the application of Big Data to social questions. We use examples drawn from
our Science and Technology Studies (STS) analyses of -omic biology and high energy physics to demonstrate the utility of
three theoretical concepts: (i) primary and secondary inscriptions, (ii) crafted and found data, and (iii) the locus of
legitimate interpretation. These help us to show how the histories, organisational forms, and power dynamics of a field
lead to different enactments of big data. The paper suggests that these concepts can be used to help us to understand the
ways in which Big Data is being enacted in the domain of the social sciences, and to outline in general terms the ways in
which this enactment might be different to that which we have observed in the ‘hard’ sciences. We contend that the locus
of legitimate interpretation of Big Data biology and physics is tightly delineated, found within the disciplinary institutions
and cultures of these disciplines. We suggest that when using Big Data to make knowledge claims about ‘the social’ the
locus of legitimate interpretation is more diffuse, with knowledge claims that are treated as being credible made from
other disciplines, or even by those outside academia entirely.
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Q: You are sure that your statement represents scien-
tiﬁc truth?
A: I am.
Q: On what basis?
A: On the basis of the mathematics of psychohistory.
Q: Can you prove that this mathematics is valid?
A: Only to another mathematician.
Isaac Asimov, Foundation (1951)
Introduction
Over the past decade, ‘Big Data’ has been positioned as
the indispensable mode of 21st century research across
academia (Boyd and Crawford, 2012; Kitchin, 2014a).
While many of the foundational concepts and
techniques of the Big Data sciences were already well-
established practices across a number of scientiﬁc dis-
ciplines, only recently have they been assembled into a
distinct ﬁeld of research claiming legitimacy in and of
itself (Beer, 2016; Kitchin, 2014a, 2014b; Ruppert,
2015; Williams et al., 2017). While social science has a
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quantitative history with ‘big’ datasets dating back to
before Durkheim (1897 [2006]), the emergence of ‘Big
Data’ and computationally-intensive social science is a
contemporary phenomenon. As with much of the dis-
course surrounding Big Data across the board, there is
a tendency to posit the application of ‘Big Data’
approaches to social science questions as a revolution-
ary innovation in the profession, both in terms of
empirical reach and in theoretical advancement. Lazer
and Radford (2017: 20), to cite a recent example, argue
that in the span of a generation we ‘‘will witness a trans-
formation of sociological theory through these
improvements in our ability to observe dynamic social
systems.’’ Yet, as Lazer and Radford also maintain, the
presence of Big Data research in the leading sociology
journals is minimal, with much computational
social science currently being carried out not by trained
social scientists, but by computer scientists. Supporting
this, a sociologist engaged in Big Data research
described to us a major conference on Big Data social
science as being attended by around ‘‘98% computer
scientists and physicists and 2% sociologists’’ and that
attendees ‘‘weren’t engaging with the kinds of questions
that [. . .] sociology would engage with.’’
While there are, undoubtedly, a signiﬁcant number
of social scientists developing programs of sociologi-
cally-informed Big Data work with potential for advan-
cing social science, computationally-derived claims
about ‘the social’ can easily become divorced from, or
more worryingly contest the legitimacy of traditional
social science that have developed over decades: the
theoretical, epistemological, and ontological sensibil-
ities, as well as its ethical and political commitments.
In this regard, Big Data social science has ‘revolution-
ary’ potential regardless of the content (or success) of
its knowledge claims. Or, as McFarland et al. (2016: 32)
put it, despite the potential for innovation, it is a legit-
imate concern that ‘‘we may be more likely to witness
engineering colonize sociology and the social sciences
than vice versa.’’ A decade earlier, Savage and Burrows
(2007) also pointed out that the techniques of social
research have been incorporated into the circuits of
‘knowing capitalism’ (Thrift, 2005) as much ‘social
research’ takes place outside, and in (deliberate) ignor-
ance of, academic social science.
When Lazer and Radford (2017: 25) ﬁnd that what is
‘‘[p]erhaps most exciting about Big Data is the oppor-
tunity to build a science of society’’, one is left to wonder
what a vast number of social scientists are supposed to
have attempted for the past two centuries, if not such a
science. Of course, the idea that the social sciences are
‘soft’, scientiﬁcally ‘weak’ or lack internal disciplinary
integrity when compared to the ‘hard’ and more ‘scien-
tiﬁcally legitimate’ natural sciences, is not new (see, for
example, Cole, 1983; Holmwood, 2010; Pinar et al.,
2008; Storer, 1967), and these hierarchies are the context
in which disciplinary prejudices might shape the future
of Big Data applications to social science questions;
minimising the role of thinking about the social vis-a`-
vis elevating that of computational expertise through
‘scientiﬁc superiority’ discourse. Commentators have
even gone so far as to provocatively declare on the pos-
sibility for a ‘methodological genocide’, in which ‘‘vio-
lence [is] being committed under the guise of ‘Big Data’
at a methodological level that is not being discussed.’’1
Yet, as we suggest in this paper, the conditions in which
the locus of legitimate interpretation for computation-
ally-intensive Big Data social science is being manufac-
tured is sociologically quite diﬀerent to the cases of Big
Data biology and physics. This paper uses our in-depth
studies of these ‘hard’ scientiﬁc ﬁelds to critically probe
the question of who is currently poised to be the legit-
imate interpreter of Big Data social science and the
implications this may have for social science research
in the future. We take our empirically robust analyses
of biology and physics to make suggestions, provoca-
tions even, that point towards analyses of ‘Big Data’
social science that make similar use of Science and
Technology Studies (STS)-derived concepts.
Like many of our colleagues, we welcome new meth-
ods of researching the social, new ways of addressing
social science questions, but oﬀer our use of the concept
of the locus of legitimate interpretation in the paper as
a contribution to discussions about the ways in which
sociological (and other social science) sensibilities can
be retained in Big Data research, as a bulwark against
domination through technical discourse by badly-prac-
tised ‘social scientism’.
Who are the legitimate interpreters of
Big Data social science?
While there is an emerging body of critical,
social theory-informed Big Data social science
(Cockayne, 2016; Kitchin, 2014a; Kitchin and
McArdle, 2016; Niederer and Taudin Chabot, 2015;
Symons and Alvarado, 2016), we propose a critical
engagement from a diﬀerent vantage point: Science
and Technology Studies (STS). STS has historically
dealt with its objects of study – socio-technological sys-
tems and research ﬁelds – with a highly critical eye, and
thus oﬀers a number of tools for probing Big Data
computational social science (hereon BDCSS) futures.
Additionally, a vast number of STS studies exist ana-
lysing the role of scientiﬁc ﬁelds where Big Data
computation has been the dominant experimental para-
digm. We present two cases in which the authors have
extensive sociological expertise: (i) Big Data biology in
the ‘-omic’ sciences, and (ii) in Big Data high-energy
physics (HEP). Both disciplines have, for decades,
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performed Big Data production and analysis, but they
engage computational practices, data analysis and data
interpretation in diﬀerent ways. Furthermore, both
assign epistemic legitimacy and power diﬀerently to
computational versus ‘traditional’ practices in their
ﬁelds. The -omic sciences and HEP thus oﬀer a pri-
mary, comparative, empirically rich point of departure
for understanding the way in which scientiﬁc disciplines
structure legitimacy of interpretation around computa-
tional practices.
Our primary contribution to the debate will be to
show that in contrast to sociology, where ‘analysing
society’ is often framed by outsiders as if it were a ubi-
quitous expertise,2 biologists and physicists face few, if
any, challenges to their monopoly on making legitimate
knowledge claims about those aspects of the world
encompassed by their discipline. Despite increasingly
relying on computational practices that have demanded
the introduction of new forms of expertise, the compu-
tational aspect in biology and physics is often subju-
gated as a tool, a service even, to be used by those with
disciplinary grounding in the sensibilities of their dis-
cipline. However, this arrangement is not unconnected
to the way in which the Big Data of biology and physics
is made – crafted within, and for use by, these discip-
lines – and we therefore describe the critical distinction
between such ‘crafted’ and ‘found’ data in this paper.
As our extensive empirical work on biology and physics
shows, the transformation of a discipline into one that
produces and uses Big Data need not entail a revolu-
tionary transformation in the locus of legitimate inter-
pretation. However, as our observations of some Big
Data claim-making about social science questions also
show, Big Data does have the potential to erode even
further the primacy of knowledge claims about the
social made by those with groundings in disciplinary
social science, and sociology in particular.
We situate our paper in dialogue with Beer’s (2016)
work on how we should study the history (and for us,
equally the sociology) of Big Data. For Beer, ‘‘we need
to place Big Data within the genealogy of social data of
various types . . . [and]. . . approach this history by treat-
ing Big Data as both material phenomenon and also a
concept’’ (p. 1). While completely agreeing with this
approach, we advocate the value of extending beyond
social data to include other comparative articulations
of Big Data practices. In this paper, we show how Big
Data in the two domains that we have studied in depth
(biology and physics) is associated with a change in the
arrangements of work that produce and analyse these
data, the legitimation of knowledge claims, and, to
some degree, the rhetoric of the underlying epistemol-
ogy, which we use as a basis for our observations of
diﬀerence in BDCSS. By considering Big Data as an
enactment, pointing to the importance of how socio-
material sets of practices achieve and accomplish Big
Data as a meaningful phenomenon, we place Big
Data in its social and cultural context. Of course, our
notion of enactment does not deny the aﬀordances and
impacts of Big Data, nor its increasing popularity as a
novel mode of research and powerful research tool.
However, for the scientiﬁc ﬁelds we use to illustrate
this argument, we locate ‘Big Data’ within a socio-
material account that recognises not only the scientiﬁc
and technical promises of Big Data, but also the
performative capacity of the promises, the practices,
and the speciﬁcities around Big Data. As Beer (2016)
argues, Big Data as a concept ‘‘deﬁnes, enacts and
ushers in’’ (p. 9) the materiality it describes.
Fieldwork
Our argument is informed by a set of empirical projects
and participatory activities that ran over a 15-year period.
These include extended ethnographic contact in multiple
sites of scientiﬁc work, sets of qualitative interviews, a
survey of UK academic bioinformaticians, and the par-
ticipant comprehension of working in and on Big Data
programmes in both biology and physics. Bartlett has
conducted postgraduate and postdoctoral research on
‘big’ biological projects, including the Human Genome
Project (HGP) (Bartlett, 2008) and large-scale psychiatric
genetics (Arribas-Ayllon et al., 2010). With Lewis he has
also conducted research on the development of academic
bioinformatics in the United Kingdom (Bartlett et al.,
2017; Lewis and Bartlett, 2013; Lewis et al., 2016). In add-
ition to qualitative data, this research involved a survey
examining the attitudes and opinions of those working in
UK academic bioinformatics (Bartlett et al., 2016). Lewis
has also conducted interview and observational research
with scientists working in bioinformatics and proteomics
including those working at the European Bioinformatics
Institute (Lewis, 2008) and has participatory experience of
working in research centres engaged in both Big Data
biology and Big Data social science. Reyes-Galindo has
carried out extended research in the sociology of physics,
in particular themediating role of computational and data
analytic cultures in both ‘big’ and ‘small’ science settings.
This included ﬁeldwork with a computational physics
group at the Conseil Europe´en pour la Recherche
Nucle´aire (CERN) and other physics institutes around
the world, and has produced work on the role of algo-
rithms in deﬁning physics communities (Reyes-Galindo,
2016). Stephens has conducted a four-year ethnographic
study of the development of biological Big Data tools in
the novel context of cell culturing (Stephens et al.,
Forthcoming; Stephens and Lewis, 2017). Collectively
these form a substantial and robust body of studies
from which our STS-based analysis of Big Data in prac-
tice is drawn.
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In what follows, we articulate four key theoretical con-
cepts used in our analysis. We apply them to biology and
physics in speciﬁc detail, and reﬂect on their relevance for
Big Data applications to social science in a more general
way. In doing so, we demonstrate how the histories, insti-
tutional forms and power dynamics of a discipline play a
part in producing diﬀerent forms of Big Data enactment;
with concrete empirically-grounded examples in the cases
of biology and physics, and suggestions of possible
futures and research agendas in the case of the social sci-
ences learnt from those examples.
Four key concepts: Enactment, primary/
secondary inscriptions, crafted/found
data, and the locus of legitimate
interpretation
The classic notion of enactment in STS captures how
scientiﬁc work operates to bring into being the knowl-
edge-world it seeks to explore (Pickering, 1995). Studies
of sociology (Law and Urry, 2004), economics (Callon,
1998; MacKenzie, 2006), public understanding of sci-
ence (Michael, 2016), biology (Borup et al., 2006;
Brown and Michael, 2003) and physics (Barad, 2007;
Galison, 1997; Pickering, 1995) have demonstrated that
research visions and methodologies are performative in
the making and re-making of scientiﬁc disciplines and
their knowledge. Here, we show how in biology and
physics the notion of Big Data, its manipulation, and
the institutional forms that support it, are brought into
being through extensive physical, intellectual and sym-
bolic labour and material conﬁguration. Furthermore,
these enactments bring with them particular socio-
material relations, power dynamics and implications
for what form Big Data science takes and its eﬃcacy
as a research tool.
To do this, we draw upon the notion of inscriptions
(Latour and Woolgar, 1986), and especially primary
and secondary inscriptions (Lewis and Bartlett, 2013).
Laboratory instruments in this metaphor are seen as
‘‘inscription devices’’ that ‘‘transform a material sub-
stance into a ﬁgure or a diagram’’ (Latour and
Woolgar, 1986: 51), or ‘nature’ into ‘knowledge’ –
understood as socially legitimised, portable and stabi-
lised ‘facts’. In previous work examining Big Data biol-
ogy, we distinguished between Latourian primary
inscriptions that transform the material into the sym-
bolic, and secondary inscriptions that are the result of
separate, distinct transformations of the symbolic into
a second set (Lewis and Bartlett, 2013). An example
from biology of producing a primary inscription is
the physical, material work of drawing blood samples,
extracting the DNA, and genotyping the DNA on a
gene chip, producing hundreds of thousands of data
points. An example of producing a secondary inscrip-
tion is taking these existing primary inscriptions and
conducting Genome-Wide Association Studies
(GWAS), using a dataset containing the genomic and
phenotypic data of thousands of individuals, in order to
discover associations between genetic variants and
phenotypic traits.3 These processes of secondary
inscription can be conducted without ever entering a
traditional laboratory, and produce a distinct form of
representation with diﬀerent standards.
We extend this analysis from biology to physics and
discuss the implications of this way of thinking for Big
Data social science. In doing so, we develop a distinction
between crafted and found data. ‘Crafted’ data are
inscriptions produced within the scientiﬁc community
which will use these inscriptions in order to make know-
ledge claims. In other words, data that have been pro-
duced with the disciplinary sensibilities of scientists in
mind; speciﬁcally oriented, for example, towards answer-
ing questions that are meaningful within the discipline.
‘Found’ data, on the other hand, are inscriptions that
‘exist’ independently of the intent and design of the scien-
tiﬁc community doing the analysis (for example, admin-
istrative or transactional data that reﬂects the priorities
and purposes of its producers).4 Found data are ‘out
there’, already existing as inscriptions, independent of
any prospective or imagined disciplinary use and control.
This paper suggests that the diﬀerences between the way
in which Big Data is enacted in biology and physics, and
in its application to social science questions, is related to
the fact that the natural sciences craft their own inscrip-
tions, while those applying data to social science ques-
tions often draw on existing, ‘found’ inscriptions from
Twitter, Google or Amazon for example.
The notion of the locus of legitimate interpretation
originates in the work of Collins and Evans (2007: 120).
It describes the (social) ‘location’, in terms of commu-
nities and expertise, from which legitimate knowledge
claims and judgements of those knowledge claims can
be made. To illustrate, we can think brieﬂy about where
we would ﬁnd the locus of legitimate interpretation in
two starkly diﬀerent cases. Collins and Evans argue
that the locus of legitimate interpretation for art
extends beyond the community of art-producers.
Audiences and art critics are treated as legitimate asses-
sors of the quality of the work. By comparison, in the
sciences, the locus of legitimate interpretation usually
lies well inside the community of producers, as only
those with specialist expertise are deemed suﬃciently
equipped to make valid judgements. When deploying
this analytical framework it is important to keep dis-
tinct its descriptive application – documenting empiric-
ally who holds legitimacy within a speciﬁc context – and
its normative application – arguing that particular
groups ought to be deemed legitimate interpreters. In
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this paper we do both; by drawing on our empirical
sociologies of biology and physics to describe the
locus of legitimate interpretation in these cases, and
by raising questions about where and how the locus
of legitimate is to be found in questions of BDCSS.
Describing this in terms of inscriptions and crafted/
found data, we argue that in -omic biology and HEP
physics, both primary and secondary inscriptions are
crafted, analysed, and interpreted within the established
scientiﬁc communities. By contrast, an emerging para-
digm in Big Data applications to social questions is to
create secondary inscriptions from data found outside
the discipline. Further, it is possible to make ‘social’
knowledge claims using Big Data, which are taken to
be legitimate, from outside of the disciplinary cultures
of social science. In other words, the ‘location’ of the
making, analysis, and interpretation of big social data,
and the judgement on these knowledge claims allows us
to say that the locus of legitimate interpretation is much
more widely distributed in the social sciences than is the
case in biology and physics.
Enacting Big Data in biology
Big Data underwent its foundational enactment as a
scientiﬁc and political force in biology during the
period of 1990–2003 with the HGP. The HGP remains
the biggest biological collaboration in history
(Hilgartner, 2013; Tripp and Grueber, 2011). It pro-
vided the technological and informational platform,
as well as the inspiration and model, for the post-
HGP data-driven sciences (Collins et al., 2003), such
as genomics, proteomics, transcriptomics, and metabo-
lomics, collectively known as the ‘-omic’ sciences. In the
post-HGP era, techniques for producing signiﬁcant
amounts of data have meant that both the production
and analysis of big biological data have become avail-
able to smaller and smaller research groups (Check
Hayden, 2014; Grada and Weinbrecht, 2013). The
establishment of biology as, at least in part, an infor-
mational, computational science, has been accompa-
nied by claims that this new way of doing biology is
data-driven (Leonelli, 2016; Stevens, 2013), and even
(perhaps erroneously) ‘hypothesis-free’ (Cooke Bailey
et al., 2014).5
Biologists, bioinformatics and
bioinformaticians
While bioinformatics has a history almost as long as the
history of computing itself (Garcia-Sancho, 2012;
November, 2012; Strasser, 2010; Suarez-Diaz, 2010),
the HGP was the catalyst for its rapid growth and dis-
ciplinary infrastructure of conferences, journals, grants
and undergraduate and postgraduate courses (Lewis
et al., 2016; Stevens, 2013). The move to enacting Big
Data brought with it a requirement for a formalisation
of mathematical and computer literacy through -omic-
oriented bioinformatics (Lewis and Bartlett, 2013;
Lewis et al., 2016). This collective enterprise encom-
passes a broad set of actors including data curators,
data analysts, and computer engineers that seek to
align computational analysis with large data sets
(Harvey and McMeekin, 2002). However, bioinfor-
matics – like any other ﬁeld – is itself a distinct and
recognisable community and set of practices (Bartlett
et al., 2017). In the theoretical language developed here,
bioinformatics is the work of producing secondary
inscriptions through the application of computational
techniques to the primary inscriptions made in the
laboratory. That is, the data are crafted by the biologist
and their contact with the material, biological world –
be that a cell line, a living organism, or a survey of
people – and is then further transformed by a process
of secondary inscription by a bioinformatician.
The status of bioinformatics is contested within the
reward and recognition structures of biology. This is
clear in the contrast between Stein’s (2008) celebrative
account of the total integration of computational meth-
ods into biology in the statement ‘‘[b]iologists are all
bioinformaticians now’’ (p. 151) with Chang’s (2015:
151) pessimistic claims that ‘‘there are not enough
bioinformaticians’’ and that ‘‘[b]iological data will con-
tinue to pile up unless those who analyse them are
recognized as creative collaborators in need of career
paths’’ (see also Bartlett et al., 2016, 2017). In our own
work, we refer to contestation over the institutional
position of computational analysis in biology as the
‘middling’ of bioinformatics (Lewis et al., 2016), brid-
ging the gap between computer science and biology but
as yet not forming its own, coherent, disciplinary space,
nor occupying those of its ‘parental’ disciplines.6
Although conceptually central to the doing of post-
genomic science, bioinformatics is institutionally
peripheral, and is often positioned by biologists as a
service to biology (Bartlett et al., 2017; Lewis and
Bartlett, 2013), blending into the background (Baren-
Nawrocka, 2013). In many cases, despite the rhetoric,
we have found that data analysis and computation is
not a particularly highly valued or rewarded activity
within biology (Lewis et al., 2016).
It should be noted here that much computing expert-
ise is brought into biology from outside the discipline.
Bioinformatics is often blackboxed as far as many
biologists are concerned – with analysis being con-
ducted by collaborating bioinformaticians, often at a
distance (even if they are within the same institution)
– or through the use of standardised bioinformatics
tools (Lewis and Bartlett, 2013). Some in the ﬁeld see
this as a positive, while others recognise the problems
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of this ‘collaborative or collective interdisciplinarity’
(see Calvert, 2010; Lewis and Bartlett, 2013). For exam-
ple, while the computational work is performed by
bioinformaticians, the burden of analysis is shared
with biologists, who through the disciplinary and insti-
tutional systems of prestige, retain a dominant position
with regard to the locus of legitimate interpretation.
Importantly, biologists have institutional ‘ownership’
of the data of Big Data biology.
There are instances in which ‘big biology’ produces
Big Data – the case of the HGP, for example. Here,
bioinformatics can be conducted in large-scale settings,
such as the National Centre for Biotechnology
Information (NCBI) in the USA, the DNA Data
Bank of Japan (DDBJ) and the European
Bioinformatics Institute (EBI). But Big Data also pro-
duces big science. We observe this not only in the epi-
stemic demands for Big Data to tackle genetically and
phenotypically complex disorders, but also in that the
resulting Big Data (and the techniques and technologies
developed in these projects) enables (scientiﬁcally, insti-
tutionally, and ‘politically’) further big science projects.
This is clear in the way in which the accomplishment
and legacy of the HGP has helped to shape many other
satellite centres of post-HGP -omic science. The scale of
bioinformatics projects therefore can also be much
smaller, sometimes involving only a handful of
researchers. Such smaller science Big Data work often
draws on computational and statistical expertise from a
centralised group within their host institution. Many
universities establish a central bioinformatics hub for
its researchers to work with when they see ﬁt. Yet these
smaller science settings may still rely on components of
big science, by drawing upon the training, data, appli-
cations, and collaborative skills of institutions such as
the EBI. Furthermore, the work of these smaller science
Big Data projects can be aggregated using standardised
protocols for data collection and recording (Wallis
et al., 2013). This is already underway in the ‘-omic
sciences’ (Harvey and McMeekin, 2010; Leonelli,
2012, 2013), and is spreading to other areas of bio-
logical research such as cell culturing (Khan et al.,
2014). Reﬂecting this, big biological data science is pro-
mised as being geography-free, as collation disentangles
it from the peculiarities and particularities of localised
settings, with global infrastructures allowing seemingly
‘frictionless’ international ﬂow.
The epistemic culture (Knorr-Cetina, 1999) of
biology has shifted in the post-HGP era. Some argue
this is a move from ‘hypothesis-driven’ research into
an era of ‘hypothesis-free’ biology (Cooke Bailey
et al., 2014), although, perhaps more accurately, the
move to data driven biology is a change from deduct-
ive to inductive reasoning (Leonelli, 2012). This
change has already been institutionalised and
embedded within the distinctive nomenclature of the
‘-omic’ sciences. An important point must be reiter-
ated with regard to this new, inductive, mode; Big
Data biology ‘crafts’ its data. The vast databases of
-omic data that are said to ‘drive’ much contemporary
biology have been crafted in a laboratory, by techni-
cians and scientists trained in biological ways of think-
ing and according to the disciplinary sensibilities of
biologists. Even when computational biologists come
to use these large data sets at one step removed,
having played no part in the production of the data,
the data that they use are still crafted within the epi-
stemic culture of biology.
The locus of legitimate interpretation for Big Data
biology is located ﬁrmly within the epistemic, disciplin-
ary culture of biology: data are produced within the
discipline, in laboratories, by biologists, or by computer
scientists with biological sensibilities in mind. That is,
although computational and statistical expertise has
been drawn into the discipline, bringing with it a new
style of statistical reasoning (Leonelli, 2012; Lewis
et al., 2016), it has been done so in a way that positions
it subordinate to the disciplinary concerns of biology
(Lewis and Bartlett, 2013). We now turn our attention
to Big Data in physics.
Enacting Big Data in physics
Historical and ethnomethodological studies identify
three families of practice in physics: theory, phenomen-
ology, and experiment. Phenomenology encompasses
the cumulus of disciplines that does the bulk of the
‘translation’ between theory and experiment (Galison,
1997; Merz and Knorr-Cetina, 1997; Reyes-Galindo,
2011). Speciﬁcally, Reyes-Galindo (2014) describes
physics as being structured around two opposite poles
of practices: theoretical and experimental, but with
many intermediate micro-cultures mediating the trans-
mission of knowledge across them. In all these micro-
cultures, computation has for a long time been an
important element, particularly in HEP experiments,
which are nowadays recognised as forerunners of Big
Data science (Murray, 2014). Yet it is only recently,
with the rise of ‘Big Data’ rhetoric in the media and
in commercial and academic discourse, that physicists
have begun to market their traditional practices as ‘Big
Data’. Indeed, the ﬁrst occurrences of the term
‘Big Data’ in the physics arXiv preprint server – the
single most important resource for vanguard physics –
are as recent as 2013 (Anderson et al., 2013), while the
earliest mentions of ‘Big Data’ related to physics in the
scientiﬁc press refer not to a discourse on the promises
or possibilities of Big Data, but to the problems of sus-
tainable and reliable computational infrastructure that
Big Data sets imply (Lynch, 2008).
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The locus of legitimate interpretation
in HEP
Nowhere in physics has the rapid accumulation of vast
amounts of data been more visible than in HEP, as
experiments have increasingly demanded more data-
points to reach the conﬁdence levels required by physi-
cists to claim that a ‘ﬁnding’ is in fact a ‘discovery’
(5 standard deviations are the norm in HEP). The para-
digmatic case of Big Data in physics is CERN and the
Large Hadron Collider (LHC) experiments (Knorr-
Cetina, 1999; Kriege, 1996), though other projects
such as the Sloan Digital Sky Survey and other sky-
mapping experiments in astronomy and astrophysics
also produce terabytes of analysable data (Zhang and
Zhao, 2015). For example, one of the core CERN
experiments, Compact Muon Solenoid (CMS), pro-
duces around 1 petabyte (100 gigabytes) of ‘raw’ data
per second, and there are similar ﬁgures for the other
experiments. The quantities of data produced are only
expected to increase, although CERN currently only
stores in the order of 35 petabytes a year as the over-
whelming majority is ﬁltered out. Yet a modern physics
experiment does not necessarily require the size and
complexity of CERN to reach the data-acquisition
numbers of CERN. The smaller-scale, Mexico-based
High-Altitude Water Cherenkov Observatory
(HAWC) international collaboration generates about
1 terabyte of data per day, just under the same order
of magnitude as the data produced at CERN, but –
unlike CERN – records all data for possible later ana-
lyses (Gitler and Klapp, 2016).
In big physics settings such as CERN, which
involves work in a number of highly specialised areas,
the multiple loci of legitimate interpretation are found
in the collectively-vetted eﬀort. Locating these is some-
what more complex than the situations captured by
Collins and Evans’ (2007) portrayal of inter-expertise
dialogue and meta-expertise interdisciplinary manage-
ment, as the multiple expertises in CERN often overlap
and become too complicated for a single actor to fully
comprehend. Despite the detectors being physically
grouped at two sister sites near Geneva and there
being a known set of core group leaders, CERN is a
globally-distributed knowledge-producing network in
which the acquisition, handling and processing, and
interpretation of the data is carried out by several inde-
pendent communities within ‘the experiment’. The data
are cleaned even as it is being acquired, recorded and
then interpreted and re-interpreted in several steps in
which interpretative legitimacy is ‘lent’ to the expert
groups that intervene in each step. Once all the steps
come together, a ﬁnal stable consensus is reached after
a long gruelling process of micro-data crafting, for
example, when a ‘discovery paper’ is published in
collaborative authorship. The importance of each par-
allel interpretational mesh-point and the locality of
each step is made most obvious by the number of
authors in contemporary discovery ‘megapapers’ – the
Physics Letter B paper announcing the discovery of the
Higgs boson was signed as ‘CMS collaboration’ and
‘ATLAS collaboration’ and jointly included more
than 6,000 authors. As a senior computational physicist
remarked in interview:
‘‘Nowadays even building the detectors has become an
industrial enterprise. In the past, a group or a small set
of groups was responsible for designing, building,
operating the whole detector, the calorimeter, the
vertex detector, particle identiﬁcation detector [. . .]
Nowadays, each detector is an enterprise of many insti-
tutes, many people, so you don’t even get the overview
of the whole detector.’’
Though distributed among the collaboration teams,
the locus of legitimate interpretation remains within
‘the experiment’ as a whole; that is, within the CERN
community. The distributed interpretation makes it
impossible for a single member of the collaboration to
draw away into a personal interpretation of the entire
experimental setup, as Delfanti (2016) has described in
his discussion of deliberative democracy methods for
producing authorship in HEP. Once the ‘results’ have
been stabilised within each interpretative step in a multi-
plicity of primary inscriptions, they are then collectively
cohered into project-overarching secondary inscriptions
which are then put into collected tables of ‘deﬁnitive’
data, such as the massive Review of Particle Physics
(RPP) published by the Particle Data Group at the
Lawrence Berkley National Laboratory.
Bibliometric investigations (Basaglia et al., 2008)
and ﬁeldwork at CERN by Reyes-Galindo suggest
that, as described by Lewis and Bartlett (2013) in bio-
informatics, computational physics is generally
regarded as a less prestigious activity than other areas
of research, despite its importance for the generation of
experimental outcomes. That programming and com-
putation in scientiﬁc settings – and speciﬁcally in phys-
ics – is, broadly speaking, regarded as ‘‘production
rather than research’’ (Slayton, 2013: 38) and is
known to be a feature not just of scientiﬁc computing
but of the whole ﬁeld of programming (Ensmenger,
2012). It is therefore unsurprising that the critical com-
ponent of data analysis at CERN, infrastructure com-
puting, is generally looked down upon as ‘technical’
and ‘service’ work and is perceived as an activity at
some remove from the prestige of ‘real’ research.
Low-level data reconstruction, though seen as being
closer to ‘research’ and requiring signiﬁcantly more spe-
cialised knowledge of physics, is still seen as being less
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prestigious than other research practices such as hard-
ware development. This work – save for a few individ-
uals who are considered the leading experts of their
ﬁelds – is the domain of the graduate students and
postdoctoral researchers who do most of the grunt
work. Nevertheless, informants in Reyes-Galindo’s
empirical research described the way in which recon-
struction is divided into many subspecialties. Each of
these requires intensive specialisation that is often
experiment-speciﬁc. Between these specialities hierar-
chies have formed, though in general reconstruction
work is of lesser status to that of conducting ‘original’
research. Speaking of the status of computational
work, a senior computational physicist at CERN
reﬂected that:
‘‘you’re not a technician because you still have a degree
in physics, often a PhD anyway, but nevertheless you
are not doing the bulk of the attraction of the
ﬁeld . . . [computational work] is not itself, you know,
the most attractive topic to talk about.’’
In other words, computational physics is not only sub-
ordinate to other modes of physical thinking, it is a
dispreferred way of working and thinking when com-
pared to those which attracted physicists to the ﬁeld in
the ﬁrst place. The production of primary inscriptions
at CERN (the local experimental groups, e.g.
CMS, ATLAS) and the interpretation (not production)
of secondary inscriptions (overarching high-level ana-
lysis) are the most esteemed and desirable ‘scientiﬁc’
work, valued far above the ‘technical’ domain of
primary inscription analysis (both general and experi-
ment-speciﬁc IT services). Data are crafted according to
the sensibilities of physicists, and much of the compu-
tational and statistical expertise is found within the dis-
cipline. Yet all these practices are arranged within the
experimental organization. Through the coordination
of all these local practices, modern HEP crafts its
own data and keeps the locus of legitimation interpret-
ation ﬁrmly inside the scientiﬁc community. For all
their diﬀerences in epistemic culture, -omic biology
and HEP demonstrate important similarities in the
way in which they have incorporated ‘Big Data’.
Thoughts on the social sciences,
computational social science, and the
Locus of Legitimate Interpretation
So far, in this paper, we have analysed the ways in
which data are crafted within big biology and big phys-
ics, and which communities and bodies of expertise are
deemed to be the legitimate interpreters of that data. In
this section, we make some observations about the way
in which the application of Big Data to social science
questions can be enacted in a fundamentally diﬀerent
way to the examples provided by the ‘harder’ sciences.
In the social sciences, Big Data can exist independent of
the labours of social scientists, described in this paper
as ‘found’. This is often posited as one of the epistemic
strengths of Big Data social science, despite the assump-
tions that must be made about data found outside the
discipline, regarding, for example, the comprehensive-
ness and representativeness of online populations, etc.
(Lazer and Radford, 2017). This is a fundamental
epistemic diﬀerence between the social and the natural
sciences with regard to the relationship between the
‘scientist’ and her ‘data’. For the most part, only physi-
cists and biologists are legitimate interpreters of Big
Data produced in physics and biology; the locus of
legitimate interpretation is ﬁrmly within the disciplin-
ary community. However, the ability to make a know-
ledge claim about the social that is treated as credible is
aﬀorded to a much wider spread of people. As we dis-
cussed in the opening sections, the locus of legitimate
interpretation in Big Data applications to social science
questions is much more diﬀuse. Thus, the organisational
and epistemic model of Big Data science that we ﬁnd in
the natural sciences does not ﬁnd a direct reﬂection in
Big Data social science.
In this section, we provide some clear examples of
the way in which Big Data applications to social science
questions can be performed outside of established
social science communities. It is important to stress
that these examples are not used to suggest that they
are representative of BDCSS as a whole. While we have
conducted extensive sociological research on physics
and biology, as yet we have no solid research program
to this end. Rather, these examples are intended to
serve as illustrations of the way in which Big Data
can be performed and scientiﬁcally positioned as ‘legit-
imate’ social science. This is crucial because, as we show
in our ﬁnal discussions, recent studies in the sociology
of physics have shown that analysis of physics ‘data’
performed outside of the traditionally-constituted locus
of legitimate interpretation is overwhelmingly rejected
as ‘crackpot science’ (Collins et al., 2017). This is true
even if the knowledge claims that are being produced
are the technically-savvy products of people with sig-
niﬁcant expertise in physics or related disciplines.
Knowledge claims produced by outsiders are almost
never considered legitimate by the physics community,
and are often portrayed as the antithesis of ‘good’ phys-
ics. The boundaries of physics set by physicists match
very closely the boundaries of good physics as seen by
funders, policy makers, science journalists, etc. The
examples in this section show that, in the case of
‘social’ questions, the locus of legitimate interpretation
is ‘diﬀused’, extending outside the established, discip-
linary social sciences.
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We start with a Nature special feature article (Giles,
2012), which described the status of ‘computational
social sciences’ research. This article discussed several
examples, such as the research carried out by Liben-
Nowell and Kleinberg (2007) which supported existing
social science claims about social networks, as well as
that challenged established social science views
(Ugander et al., 2012). Critically, all the studies men-
tioned in the feature were carried out not by social sci-
entists but by computer scientists. Kleinman is quoted
describing how he ‘‘. . . realized that computer science is
not just about technology’’, but rather ‘‘[i]t is also a
human topic’’ (Giles, 2012: 448). Kleinberg also adds
how he thinks of himself ‘‘as a computer scientist who
is interested in social questions’’ (Giles, 2012: 450).
Nowhere in the feature is the absence of social science
knowledge and expertise portrayed negatively, except
possibly in terms of way in which these researchers
are not tied into addressing questions that are interest-
ing to those working in established ﬁelds of social
research. It is, according to this view in Nature, scien-
tiﬁcally legitimate for a computer scientist to conduct
research into ‘social phenomena’ despite having, in the
best cases, low-level working knowledge of social phe-
nomena, traditional social science methods and social
science theory.
To make the above asymmetry clearer, we next turn
to another Nature feature by the same author that dis-
cussed the opposite case, that of social scientist claiming
to be a legitimate interlocutor about (not in) a natural
science ﬁeld. Giles (2006: 8) describes how sociologist
Harry Collins had to prove, through an incredibly dif-
ﬁcult ‘imitation game’ test judged by a panel of gravi-
tational wave physicists, that through thirty years’
experience interacting directly with the gravitational
waves community he had acquired suﬃcient ‘inter-
actional expertise’ to meaningfully and legitimately
speak the language of gravitational waves (Collins
et al., 2006). As Giles comments, Collins’ point about
legitimacy was one of the most strongly contested pos-
itions of the 1990s ‘Science Wars’ in which some nat-
ural scientists were angered by the fact that
‘‘sociologists studying science did not understand the
disciplines involved, in part because they did not prac-
tice them’’ (Giles, 2006: 8). In fact, the asymmetry is
even more extreme when we realise that the Science
Wars criticism of social science legitimacy was not
about social scientists practising natural science
(which no sociologist of science would claim to do),
but indeed only on talking about the natural sciences.
While some in computational social science stress the
revolutionary aspects of their work, others pursue the
research agenda without exclamation on its novelty,
rending it normal and uncontroversial. Such work
includes people-centric sensing and social sensing to
track physical sensors in mobile devices to ‘‘learn
about (possibly hidden) social structures’’ (Campbell
et al., 2008: 20) and ‘‘infer social relationships’’
(Krishnamurthy and Poor, 2014: 3). In the latter, inter-
action through social media posts are analysed to pro-
duce models that ‘‘facilitate understanding the
dynamics of information ﬂow in social networks and,
therefore, the design of algorithms that can exploit
these dynamics to estimate the underlying state of
nature’’ (Krishnamurthy and Poor, 2014: 3). As the
authors explain, the ‘‘motivation for th[eir] paper
stems from understanding how individuals interact in
a social network and how simple local behavior can
result in complex global behavior.’’ They defend their
methodology by pointing out that ‘‘[t]he underlying
tools used in this paper are widely used by the electrical
engineering research community in the areas of signal
processing, control, information theory, and network
communications’’ (Krishnamurthy and Poor, 2014:
19). Similar analytical forms have been applied to
studying emergency events (Xu et al., 2016), online
rumour detection (Liu and Xu, 2016), and appreciation
of cultural heritage (Pilato and Maniscalco, 2015).
Often connected in some way to the Institute of
Electrical and Electronics Engineers, these publications
operate in the space where computer science, social
media, and social analysis overlap, yet they are con-
ducted largely in isolation of the traditional knowledge
and expertise bases of social science.
The diﬀerences between the enactment and position-
ing of Big Data in the social and the natural science are
also clear in the work of another computer scientist
featured in the Nature article – Alex Pentland – and
his fascinating (and revealingly titled) book Social
Physics (Pentland, 2014). Here, ‘found’ big social data
is described as ‘‘the millions of digital bread crumbs
people leave behind via smartphones, GPS devices,
and the Internet’’ (p. x). To put it in the terms oﬀered
by Latour and Woolgar (1986), the primary inscrip-
tions that constitute big social data are ‘written’ inde-
pendent of academic big social data practices. Social
Physics, and other recent pop-social science books
(such as Stephens-Davidowitz’s Everybody Lies), prom-
ise a new and revolutionary social science, in which soci-
ety is understood in terms of relationships between and
within data written by our interaction with, among
other things, the digital economy, and in which know-
ledge claims about society are made by experts in data
analysis, with the sensibilities of social science largely
irrelevant in the face of the new data-rich world. In this,
we hear echoes of the rhetoric of ‘hypothesis free’ sci-
ence that Big Data has brought to biology (Cooke
Bailey et al., 2014). This view was similarly put forward
in an academic review-cum-manifesto for computa-
tional social science in which, it is concluded that
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through computational social science ‘‘sociology in par-
ticular, and the social sciences in general, would
undergo a dramatic paradigm shift, arising from the
incorporation of the scientiﬁc method of physical sci-
ences’’ (Conte et al., 2012). Indeed, Pentland’s vision
(exciting though it is) for a ‘social science’ of studying
information exchange without knowledge of the con-
tent or meaning is indeed a radical (and revolutionary)
departure from the intellectual mission of much of 20th
century social science – that which aims for the kind of
comprehension of human socialities that can be gained
by slower, craft-orientated methods such as
ethnography.7
Will such a ‘new discipline’ be ‘‘an example of sta-
tistics-led research with no theoretical underpinning’’?
This is how Professor Susan McVie, professor of quan-
titative criminology at the University of Edinburgh,
responded to the publicity surrounding a recent paper
uploaded to the most important ‘hard’ science e-print
server, the arXiv (BBC, 2016; Wu and Zhang, 2016).
This paper claimed that, using supervised machine
learning, the authors – who work in an Electrical
Engineering department8 – had developed a system
for distinguishing criminals from non-criminals (or as
the authors label them, ‘normal people’), with criminals
successfully identiﬁed 89% of the time. McVie is quoted
by the BBC as stressing the various biases involved in
producing a criminal conviction – the ‘found data’ used
by Wu and Zhang – pointing out that ‘‘[t]his article is
not looking at people’s behaviour, it is looking at crim-
inal conviction’’. Using the vocabulary proposed here,
McVie is not only highlighting the weakness of naı¨vely
found data, but is demanding that the locus of legitim-
ate interpretation of ‘Big Data criminology’ remains
within criminology, a community able to draw on dec-
ades of collective knowledge of dealing with crime stat-
istics, as well as understanding the biases and cultural
diﬀerences in criminal justice systems, etc.9
Surprisingly, McVie’s view did not ﬁnd support from
prestigious voices in ‘harder’ ﬁelds of science and tech-
nology. Quite the contrary. The MIT Technology
Review, for example, though acknowledging the study
as ‘‘controversial’’, supported Wu and Zhang by noting
that their work was consistent with a previous 2011
psychological experiment from Cornell University
(Emerging Technology from the arXiv, 2016). We
stress that we are not, per se, against the new possibi-
lities aﬀorded by computational social science, but
rather worried by computational exercises such as Wu
and Zhang’s study that rely on the rhetorical weight of
Big Data to convey epistemological strength on its own.
It is telling of the state of things that even critical (yet
optimist) views on the impact of computational social
sciences on traditional social sciences call for social sci-
entists to ‘‘embrace Big Data’’ (Gonza´lez-Bailo´n, 2013),
while computational experts dealing with social phe-
nomena are rarely called to conversely embrace trad-
itional sociological tradition or thought in their
research.
Wu and Zhang did not engage with existing crimino-
logical research yet their claims to a contribution to
criminology were treated seriously. Their example,
egregious though it is, shows how the naı¨vete´ of a
‘hypothesis-free social analysis’ can mutate into a
pathological form in which knowledge claims are pro-
duced which turn back decades of careful empirical,
conceptual, and ethical work. Other recent research,
such as facial recognition of ‘sexual orientation’
through deep-learning algorithms (Wang and
Kosinsky, 2018) also work against the grain of
informed reﬂections on stigmatised populations and
reveals the intricate problems linked to disciplinary-
uninformed interpretations of ‘social’ Big Data. There
is therefore a problem beyond mere epistemological or
methodological quibbling in using ‘found’ data without
sociological insight. Pentland’s Social Physics is sub-
titled ‘lessons from a new science’, and this is perhaps
exactly the point. While biology and physics are, to a
greater or lesser degree, enacting ‘Big Data’ by absorb-
ing a new way of looking at the objects of their discip-
linary gaze into the body of their disciplines, the locus
of legitimate interpretation of claims about ‘the social’
is so broad that Big Data social science can be enacted
outside traditional social science disciplinary bound-
aries, even when it is conducted inside academic insti-
tutions, and aﬀorded public legitimacy without much
say by social scientists. While we hope, like optimistic
social scientists such as Smith (2014), that in a ‘Big
Data social science’ sociologists will be required to
interpret (and critique) the outputs, we worry that the
cultural legitimacy of such demands appears to be
weaker than might be needed in order to make this so.
Discussion
The enactment of Big Data can tell us something about
the diﬀerences between disciplines and between epi-
stemic cultures, especially by concentrating on such
notions as ‘crafted’ and ‘found’ data and the ‘locus of
legitimate interpretation’. We have presented two dis-
ciplinary case studies on Big Data epistemic cultures,
illustrated their relationships to crafted and found data,
and shown how each disciplines’ locus of legitimate
interpretation is structured and connected to the cul-
tures of primary/secondary data producers and inter-
preters in each ﬁeld. Physics, with a long tradition of
dealing with Big Data, ‘produces’ its own computer
scientists, and ‘Big Data’ physics is, mostly, conducted
within the disciplinary space of ‘physics’. In other
words, the way in which Big Data has been enacted is
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in response to, and in sensitivity to, the disciplinary
needs and priorities of physics.
As described, Big Data biology, a more recent devel-
opment than Big Data physics, has had to recruit
expertise from outside the discipline. Even though
there are claims made that Big Data biology is a revo-
lutionary new form of hypothesis-free science, the locus
of legitimate interpretation still remains ﬁrmly within
biology. Expertise in data analysis alone is not deemed
suﬃcient to make legitimate biological knowledge
claims. Biologists, as the creators of the primary
inscriptions and the holders of cultural and institutional
power, are the legitimate interpreters of Big Data biol-
ogy, with the computer scientists/bioinformaticians
who produce the ‘secondary inscriptions’ being depend-
ent on, and deferring to, biologists. Bioinformatics may
be an oﬀshoot of biology, but it is tied inextricably to
the disciplinary culture and institutions of biology.
Both of these natural sciences enact Big Data science
in a signiﬁcantly diﬀerent way to that in which it is
being enacted in the social sciences.
Unlike the biologists and physicists, social scientists
in many cases do not to have disciplinary control over
the production of the Big Data that they will use – it is
not crafted but is, instead, found. As such, social sci-
entists can make no claims of exclusivity or control
over this data; anyone with the computational skills
can conduct an analysis of social media, and as
Metzler et al. (2016) suggest, it is rare that social scien-
tists have the required computational skills. So, as with
biology, in order to enact Big Data science, social sci-
ence must recruit computational and statistical expert-
ise. However, given that social scientists are not
(always) the crafters of big social data, their sensibilities
are not written into these inscriptions. Further,
claims that Big Data allows an atheoretical, hypoth-
esis-free analysis of the social gain traction due to the
low esteem in which much social science is held. The
consequence of this is that the locus of legitimate inter-
pretation is not ﬁrmly ﬁxed within the communities
trained in the social sciences. Anyone can make an
acceptably credible knowledge claim, whether by
virtue of controlling (access to) the primary inscriptions
– as is the case with proprietary data – or on the basis of
bring to bear the tools and perspectives of ‘harder’
disciplines.
Kate Metzler (2016) quotes Clive Humby, the man
responsible for Tesco’s Clubcard scheme, as saying as
long as a decade ago that ‘data is the new oil’. In this
account, it is not just a resource, but the resource of the
21st century, and those who control the data will have
tremendous economic, social and political power (Boyd
and Crawford, 2012). Even as the ‘found’ character of
much big social data renders some questions tractable
and others unaskable, data grants power to those
asking social questions working with and within the
organisations – often private – which hold the data
(Beer, 2016). Metzler et al.’s (2016) survey of Big
Data research in the social sciences found that, out of
3077 respondents involved in Big Data research, just
over half (1690) had most recently used administrative
data, 927 used social media data, and 697 used com-
mercial/propriety data. In current BDCSS practice,
both the locus of legitimate interpretation and the own-
ership and control of data can lie outside the bound-
aries of social science as social scientists wrestle with
others over control of empirical materials and the right
to analyse it.
This contrasts sharply with physics. Bartlett and
Reyes-Galindo have carried out extensive empirical
analysis regarding the legitimacy of physics claims
made by scientists who are not professional, practising
physicists (Collins et al., 2017). This physics ‘boundary
work’ (Gieryn, 1983) has shed light on the sociological
structures of so-called ‘fringe’ or unorthodox physics
and, importantly, to the relationships between produ-
cers of physics’ primary inscriptions and outsiders to
the physics community. What is observed is that, in
physics, the legitimacy of primary and secondary
inscription production is highly closed in itself: those
that produce primary inscriptions belong to the same
social group (or network) as those that produce second-
ary inscriptions, and the legitimacy of interpreting the
results legitimately is based on belonging to these social
networks, not on personal characteristics or speciﬁc
skills.
There are cases in which ‘outsiders’ to these closed
networks attempt to create alternative readings of
established physics, such as when mathematically-
informed engineers (and particularly electrical engin-
eers) re-evaluate recognised theoretical claims or
experimental results. The ‘exclusion boundary work’
that follows is the same across all the ﬁelds of physics
explored. Outsiders are ignored when they are not sci-
entists, isolated when they are practising scientists, and
in the more extreme cases ridiculed and declared
‘cranks’ or ‘crackpots’ by the scientiﬁc community
(Reyes-Galindo, 2016). Compare this to the response
to a criminology paper produced by electrical engin-
eers; ‘social physics’ and hypothesis-free Big Data
social science have developed into legitimate areas
that are autonomous and authoritative despite their
revolutionary intent. The locus of legitimate interpret-
ation in physics presents strong social closure, while in
social science it is considerably more open.
Thus, while in physics outsiders who attempt to
overturn established knowledge claims or methods are
de-legitimised because of their status as an outsider, a
signiﬁcant part of (for example) ‘social physics’ legiti-
macy-talk hinges on the strengths of being an outsider.
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By contrast, the physics community would and does act
swiftly in cases where not only individual knowledge
claims but also its professional legitimacy is contested.
With reference to our normative (rather than
descriptive) application of the concept of the ‘locus of
legitimate interpretation’, we draw attention to what
might be the consequences of the diﬀerences between
the tightly bounded locus of legitimate interpretation
found in biology and physics, and the much more dif-
fuse, contested locus found in the social sciences. The
Wu and Zhang episode suggests that an extreme ﬂexi-
bility of the locus of legitimate interpretation can lead
to ‘pathological’ data-driven social science that can,
importantly, be taken seriously. Sensitivity to the
pathological dimensions of this kind of work is not
necessarily found outside of the social sciences – that
is, those with the technical expertise required to make
expert judgements. Furthermore, one can easily think
of research (involving stigmatised populations and
minorities, race and gender relations, etc.) in which the-
oretically and ethically uninformed data-driven social
science could have quite profoundly negative wider
impacts, if given legitimacy. At the very least, critical
accounts of Big Data sociology are required to coun-
terbalance the data-driven hype. Social scientists should
not be shy of performing their own boundary work.
While Big Data-driven social science has presented
itself as immensely disruptive to existing research, and
certainly introduces new tools, methods and possibili-
ties to probe societies and cultures, our research reson-
ates with previous discussions about the importance of
examining Big Data claims with greater scrutiny and
clarity (Beer, 2016). We resist the picture that the
future of social science is made up exclusively of Big
Data-given research, even while acknowledging that
Big Data sociology can become a parallel ﬁeld of
research to ‘traditional’ sociology. However, we do
argue there is a key issue for social science in terms of
retaining and monitoring control over which collectives
and individuals constitute the locus of legitimate inter-
pretation in BDCSS. Unlike physics, this has been com-
plicated for social science due to the lack of substantive
base in computational mathematical methodologies,
and unlike both physics and biology, because of the
relative intellectual prestige of social science at the
‘softer’ end of the disciplines. This paper has argued
that STS provides the basis for important critique of
Big Data science. Following Eyal (2013), there is a
question of jurisdiction as to who has control over a
set of tasks and who are the legitimate interpreters of
the ﬁndings. There is also a question as to what social
and institutional arrangements need to be in place for
that authority to be maintained, and in what situations
it can be challenged. Developments in computation and
access to large data sets (as well as pre-existing
hierarchies) have meant that sociologists and other
social scientists face challenges to be the legitimate
interpreters of social data in ways that biologists and
physicists do not.
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Notes
1. Carrigan M. Emma Uprichard: Big Data and
‘Methodological Genocide’, editorial, Methodspace.
Accessed 9 September 2017. URL: https://www.method-
space.com/emma-uprichard-big-data-methodological-
genocide/
2. Indeed, this goes beyond mere hierarchies of disciplinary
prestige and we grant that there is a minimal ‘common-
sense’ sociological knowledge intrinsic to all individuals
living in any society; all socialised individuals must have
some tacit capacity to understand and analyse society in
order to live in society. By comparison, these individuals
need no such understanding of biology to keep their blood
flowing, or physics to prevent them spinning off into space.
3. It is important to note that these statistical associations
are not themselves ‘interpretations’. Bartlett, attending
a psychiatric genetics workshop, observed a senior bioin-
formatician present the statistical associations discovered
during their work who ended his presentation by saying
that he couldn’t tell you what any of this meant biologic-
ally, and that it was the job of the biologists present to
perform the interpretation. This anecdote also points us
towards where the locus of legitimate interpretation is to
be found in Big Data biology.
4. The distinction between found and crafted data is well
known within qualitative social science, though not
always articulated in these terms. For example, in diary
analysis, crafted diary data would involve asking (perhaps
even training) participants to complete a diary of their
experiences as part of the research (see Alaszewski et al.,
2007) whereas found diary data would be analysis of diary
entries the participants created independently of the
research (see Coffey, 2014).
5. Anderson (2006) boldly announced that the advent of the
‘Petabyte Age’ rendered theory and the scientific method
‘obsolete’. As with many commentators, he talked of ‘Big
Data’ in the language of a natural event – in this case as a
‘deluge’. Franks (2012), for example, steps up the level of
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destruction (disruption?) and describes it as a ‘tidal wave’,
while Steimle (2015) warns of us ‘drowning in Big Data’.
6. It is important to recognise that we are making a distinc-
tion here between bioinformatics as a recognisable com-
munity and bioinformatics as a legitimate discipline that
exists independently of biology.
7. There has been some excitement about a future social science
that moves beyond ‘outmoded’ methods devised for 20th
century societies, unfit for new, 21st century forms of social-
ity (see, for a starting point, Savage and Burrows, 2007).
8. Curiously, electrical engineers are well represented in
‘fringe’ physics communities (Collins et al., 2017).
9. In contrast to Wu and Zhang’s theoretically light work,
Williams et al. (2017) conducted an ESRC funded Big
Data study using classic criminological theory to inform
the collection, transformation, classification and modelling
of over 200 million tweets to identify their affordances and
limitations in relation to crime pattern estimation.
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